W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects

Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects

1994

Alternative Management Programs Within the Atlantic Sea
Scallop Placopecten magellanicus Fishery: Property Rights,
Transferable Quotas and Fishing Effort
Niels E. Moore
College of William and Mary - Virginia Institute of Marine Science

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd
Part of the Fresh Water Studies Commons, and the Oceanography Commons

Recommended Citation
Moore, Niels E., "Alternative Management Programs Within the Atlantic Sea Scallop Placopecten
magellanicus Fishery: Property Rights, Transferable Quotas and Fishing Effort" (1994). Dissertations,
Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539617668.
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.25773/v5-nzh5-hp16

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS WITHIN THE ATLANTIC
SEA SCALLOP PLACOPECTEN MAGELLANICUS FISHERY: PROPERTY
RIGHTS', TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS AND FISHING EFFORT

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the School of Marine Science
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Niels E. Moore
1994

f

LIBRARY

\

of the

\

VIRGINIA INSTITUTE 1

\\ MARINE SCIENCE

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Niels E. Moore
Approved, May 1994

/James E. Kirkley,
D.
Committee Chairman/Advisor

John M. Brubaker, Ph.D

William D. DuPauI, Ph.D.

Maurice P. Lyrrch, Ph.D.

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, Ed and Inge, and my wife,
Heather.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................vi
LIST OF TABLES.................................................vii
LIST OF FIGURES...............................................viii
ABSTRACT........................................................ ix
INTRODUCTION..................................................... 2
Fishery Management............................................2
The Placopecten Magellanicus Fishery......................... 6
INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND/FISHERY PROBLEMS.......................... 9
Industrial Background.........................................9
The Open Access / Common Property Problem................... 12
Proposed Regulations........................................ ,15
METHODOLOGY..................................................... 19
Linear Programming Models................................... 20
Inverse Derived Demand For Quota............................ 24
Rent Gains From Trade....................................... 26
RESULTS

30

Inverse Derived Demand For Quota............................ 30
Fleet Rents Before

Trade................................... 32

Equilibrium Market

Price................................... 33

Fleet Rents After Trade

35

COMPARATIVE EVALUATION..........................................44
Inverse Derived Demand For Quota............................ 44
Fleet Rents Before.. Trade................................... 45
Equilibrium Market.. Price................................... 46
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Fleet Rents After Trade......................................47
Quota DistributionAfter Trade............................... 50
CONCLUSIONS..................................................... 52
LITERATURE CITED................................................ 56
VITA...............................

v

59

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I want to thank foremost my major professor, Jim Kirkley,
for his steadfast patience, expertise, and assistance.

He

introduced me to the subject matter and patiently guided me
throughout my study.

Jim's open door policy and friendship were

greatly appreciated.
I would also like to thank all of my committee members:
John Brubaker, for his general suggestions and assistance, Bill
DuPaul, for his insight of the scallop fishery and advice, David
Evans, for his mathematical and statistical recommendations as
well as assistance with data presentation, Mo Lynch, for his
editorial rewrites and numerous suggestions and Bart Theberge,
for his knowledge and insight related to fisheries and maritime
law.
I also appreciate the camaraderie and assistance of all of
my fellow classmates and everyone in the Advisory Service
department.

Thanks to Ryan Carnagie for all of his suggestions.

Special thanks to Chris Collumb for his editorial and A/V
assistance, as well as numerous recommendations.
I also greatly appreciate and acknowledge Virginia Sea Grant
and the Saltonstall/Kennedy Grant for their continued financial
support.
Finally, special thanks to my parents and Heather, my better
half, longtime companion, and wife, whose patience and
understanding made it all possible.

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1.

Inverse derived demand functions (NTE/ITE model)...........31

2.

Inverse derived demand functions (ITQ model).............. 31

3.

Fleet rents before trade (NTE/ITE model)................... 32

4.

Fleet rents before trade (ITQ model)....................... 32

5.

Equilibrium market price (NTE/ITE model - after trade)

6.

Equilibrium market price (ITQ model - after trade)........ 34

33

7. Estimated unit quota rent sensitivity to changes in
domestic landings and imports.............................. 35
8.

Fleet rents after trade (ITE model)........................ 37

9.

Fleet rents after trade (ITQ model)........................ 3 7

10. Extrapolated rent gains from trade for the entire full
time east coast fleet (ITE model).......................... 49
11. Extrapolated rent gains from trade for the entire full
time east coast fleet (ITQ model).......................... 49

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1. Landings and fishing effort (days fished) of Atlantic sea
scallops, 1960-1991.........................................10
2. Composite fishing mortality on Atlantic sea scallops for
Delmarva, South Channel, and Southeast Georges Bank, 19821990........................................................ 11
3.

Fleet rent at varying effort............................... 13

4.

Aggregate derived demand................................... 24

5.

Equilibrium market price at quota = Y .......................25

6.

Equilibrium market price at varying quota amounts.......... 26

7.

Marginal cost curve................. ...................... 27

8.

Vessel rent................................................ 28

9.

Marginal cost curves....................................... 28

10.

Equilibrium market price(NTE/ITE

model)................... 33

11.

Equilibrium market price(ITQ model)........................ 34

12.

Quota distribution after trade (ITE model)................. 3 9

13.

Quota distribution after trade (ITQ model)................. 40

14. Additional landings per vessel under an ITE vs. an ITQ
program..................................................... 41
15. Fleet rents per year (NTE/ITE model - before and after
trade)...................................................... 42
16.

Fleet rents per year (ITQ model -before and after trade)..42

17.

Percentage rent gains as resultof quota trade in an ITE
program..................................................... 43

18. Percentage rent gains as result of quota trade in an ITQ
program..............

43

ABSTRACT
Alternative management programs for the sea scallop
Placopecten magellanicus were discussed and compared. Net
economic rents (profits) under three different management options
including non-transferable effort (NTE), individual transferable
effort (ITE), and individual transferable quota (ITQ) regulations
were estimated for a panel data sample of nine scallop vessels.
Through linear programming models, rental/lease prices for
quota (shadow values) were determined by vessel. These values
along with their corresponding quota amounts were regressed
utilizing Tobin's censored regression technique, thereby forming
an inverse derived demand function for each vessel. The most
efficient vessels within the fleet were willing to pay the
greatest amount per unit of quota at the various levels of quota
supplied.
Through the summation of all vessels' demand functions, an
aggregate inverse demand curve for the fleet and total fleet
rents before trade were approximated. Resulting equilibrium
market prices for quota were calculated for the ITE and ITQ
programs.
Finally, total fleet rent gains from trade (ITE and
ITQ programs only) were examined.
ITE- and ITQ-based management programs offered the sample
fleet greater economic rents compared to the current NTE-oriented
management program. Although these results may or may not
reflect the potential outcome of either approach on the East
coast scallop fleet as a whole, if these results were
extrapolated over the whole fleet, approximately $1,900,000 in
total rent would be generated by the vessels remaining in the
fishery at pre-Amendment 4 inception approximate catch levels if
trading of effort were allowed. The potential economic benefits
garnered from either property-rights based management program
would be greatest (on a percentage basis) if catch rates were
roughly 50% of 1987-1991 levels, as less efficient vessels would
essentially be forced to leave the fishery.
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ALTERNATIVE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS WITHIN THE ATLANTIC
SEA SCALLOP PLACOPECTEN MAGELLANICUS FISHERY: PROPERTY
RIGHTS, TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS AND FISHING EFFORT

INTRODUCTION
Fishery Management
Fishery management in the United States has historically
emphasized resource conservation.

However, management that

protects resource stocks by focusing primarily on the resource or
on purely biological objectives creates a potential problem -society may not obtain the maximum net benefits from the
exploitation and utilization of the resource.
Likewise, managers and researchers have given extensive
attention to resolving the open access/common property problem
identified by Warming (1911) and Gordon (1954).

In an open

access/common property fishery, the resource is public and
accessible to all whom are properly licensed.

Neither fishermen

nor managers have property rights to the resource.

As a result,

the number of vessels in the fishery frequently expands until
overcapitalization ensues, economic rent (profit) is dissipated,
and society may not realize maximum benefits from the resource.
Through the 1950s, 60s, 70s and early 1980s, many resource
managers and researchers suggested that limited entry or
controlled access management programs appeared to best address
the problems caused by overcapitalization (Gordon, 1954; Rettig
and Ginter, 1978; Sissewine and Kirkley, 1982).

However,

Crutchfield (1979) demonstrated that many controlled access
management programs would not likely prevent overcapitalization.
2
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Capital stuffing (the unnecessary expansion of inputs in order to
increase catch capability) would probably still occur.

Anderson

(1991) and Neher et a l . (1989) have subsequently argued that
achieving maximum net benefits from fishery resources requires a
solution of the open-access/common property problem.
Most management programs in existence now do not address the
open access problem and instead focus on resource conservation.
A common regulatory approach is to limit overall fishing effort
(input).

Non-transferable effort (NTE) regulations control the

inputs that are utilized by fishermen towards catching a fish
stock.

For example, NTEs might limit the input of allowable days

at sea (effort quota) of a fisherman's vessel during a season.
Unfortunately, capital stuffing in the form of increased
efficiency often occurs and defeats the intended effort control
(Dupont, 1991) .
Another widely used regulation establishes a quota on the
total amount of harvest in a fishery during a season.

Under a

quota program, the fishery is closed when the pre-established
quota is caught.

Unfortunately, a race to fish often occurs when

a season's fishery is opened.

This race to fish encourages

capital stuffing and excessive fishery effort resulting in
increased cost per unit of effort, large price swings in the
target species, and major safety problems (Scott, 1988;
Crutchfield, 1979) .
Trip limits restrict the poundage a vessel may harvest
during an individual trip.

Although intended to distribute catch
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more evenly over a season, trip limits rarely prevent fishery
closure and often increase per-unit harvesting costs even when
used in conjunction with an overall quota (Sissenwine & Kirkley,
1980; Kirkley and Dupaul, 1990).
Other approaches use taxes as a regulative device.

By using

input and/or output taxes, managers attempt to discourage fishing
effort and total catch respectively.

These approaches require

legislation, increased management flexibility, and greater
administrative and enforcement costs (Sissenwine and Kirkley,
1980) .
Controlling access to the fishery is a managerial method
that was once considered a cure-all to fisheries

(Rettig, 1984).

For example, by establishing a maximum allowable number of
vessels in the fishery, managers hope to reduce or maintain the
total harvest of the fleet.

Once again, by itself, limited entry

does not prevent capital stuffing (Crutchfield, 1979).
In an open access fishery, the preceding regulatory devices
do not create sufficient managerial control to prevent
overcapitalization.

Alternative managerial approaches attempt to

alleviate the problems associated with overcapitalization by
establishing limited ownership, or property rights, in the
resource.
One potential property-right technique used in management of
some fisheries throughout the world is the individual
transferable quota (ITQ).

ITQs were initially proposed by Dales

(1968) as a method of pollution control.

Under Dales' proposal,
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individual industrial sites were allowed to release a set amount
of pollution over a certain time period.

When a factory neared

its quota, it could attempt to purchase rights (to pollute) from
another factory.

Thus, the total amount of pollution was limited

(assuming compliance), yet quota (right to pollute) was available
to all on the open market.

Later, Christy (1973) proposed ITQs

as a possible managerial technique for fisheries.
In an ITQ program, a total allowable catch (TAC) is set for
the fishery over a specific period of time (season) and a fixed
number of fishermen is allocated rights to the fishery.

During

the season, renting, leasing or selling of exclusive rights to
the TAC is allowed between fishermen.

The price of these rights

is generated by market forces to reflect the full difference
between the aggregate minimum catching costs and the price of the
end product.

At this price, the fisherman will either demand or

offer rights depending upon whether his/her projected net income
from the catch is greater or less than the price of the rights
(Moloney and Pearse, 1979; Sissenwine and Mace, 1992).

As a

result, quota will eventually fall into the hands of the most
cost-efficient vessels.

Through this mechanism, rent of the

remaining vessels increases via greater returns per unit of
effort as redundant costs exhibited by overcapitalization are
eliminated (Clark et a l ., 1988; Geen and Nayer, 1988; Dewees,
1989) .
Another managerial approach using property rights is based
upon individual transferable effort

(ITE).

Like NTE-oriented
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techniques, ITE programs attempt to restrict the input (fishing
effort) into a fishery in order to reduce output (total catch).
However, ITEs permit the trading of the rights to a certain
amount of regulated effort such as allowable time at sea.

For

example, an ITE program might assign 100 days of fishing effort
to each vessel in a particular fishery over a season.

If one

vessel uses all of its allotted time at sea, it may attempt to
purchase quota (effort) from another vessel in the fishery.

The

potential seller of quota would likely sell quota if the quota
price is equal to or below his/her costs.

Therefore, market

forces theoretically cause ITEs to flow to the most efficient
vessel operators.
NTEs, ITQs, and ITEs represent three alternative approaches
to the management of a fishery.

Yet, only one, or a combination

of these, may govern a fishery at a time.

So, which of these

approaches would most effectively manage open access/common
property resources?

The Placovecten Magellanicus Fishery
The U.S. Atlantic sea scallop (Placopecten magellanicus)
fishery was an open access/common property resource that is
considered to be overcapitalized and its stock viability
threatened (New England Fishery Management Council, 1982, 1993) .
From 1982 to March 1, 1994, the fishery was regulated by age-atentry restrictions under the Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic
Sea Scallops.

Each vessel's average meat count per trip had to
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equal no more than 3 0 meats per pound per trip + 10% tolerance; a
seasonal adjustment was also allowed (33 m.p.p. + 10% tolerance).
For vessels landing shell stock, shell size had to be greater
than or equal to 3.5 inches.
and/or catch forfeitures.

Violators faced monetary penalties

Theoretically, therefore, minimum

average harvest size was ensured under the meat count regulation.
Unfortunately, extensive analyses and stock assessments suggested
that the age-at-entry restrictions did not adequately control
either juvenile or total mortality (N.E.F.M.C., 1992).
After several years of study and public comment, the New
England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) proposed to regulate
the fishery through NTE and several other constraints.

Effective

March 1, 1994, Amendment 4 to the Fishery Management Plan
restricts the number of vessels (moratorium), controls the annual
number of fishing days per vessel, limits crew size and gear, and
requires a vessel tracking system.
In theory, to achieve success, a fishery's management plan
must control all components of effort, many of which are illdefined or not easily measured.

Sissenwine and Kirkley (1982)

have shown, however, that these effort controls may not
adequately control fishing mortality.

For example, determined

fishermen will likely seek alternative input-augmenting
technology (changes in gear or fishing technique) that may
increase or maintain harvest levels.

Moreover, identification

and subsequent regulation of all inputs leads to dissipation of
economic rents, as well as technical and economic inefficiency
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(Anderson, 1991).

The primarily single-species, single-gear

Placopecten magellanicus fishery is considered by some a good
candidate for an ITQ program rather than an effort control (NTE)
program (Sutinen et a l . 19 92) .
Given that effort controls are currently being used in the
sea scallop fishery, a comparative economic analysis of NTEs,
ITEs, and ITQs would provide important information for
alternative management of the sea scallop fishery.

This study

examines the underlying economic ramifications of ITQ- versus
ITE- versus NTE-management programs.

It is hypothesized that

ITQs offer the maximum net return per vessel over the aggregate
fleet.
Net returns from the three potential regulatory programs are
assessed by using linear programming models of costs and earnings
and statistical models of the marketplace.

In addition, critical

transferable quota (catch and effort) market prices are estimated
using a panel data sample of vessels.

In order to determine

these equilibrium market prices, market demand for tradable quota
and effort are estimated.

Estimation is calculated by Tobin's

estimation procedures for censored data (aggregated over all
individual demand values).

By setting the aggregate demand equal

to the aggregate supply of quota or effort, market equilibrium
price for quota and effort is determined.

INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND/FISHERY PROBLEMS

Industrial Background
The Atlantic sea scallop fishery is one of the largest
commercial marine activities along the East Coast of the United
States.

Productive fishing grounds extend from Virginia to

Canada in water depths generally in excess of twenty fathoms.
The most prominent scallop vessel ports include New Bedford, MA,
Cape May, NJ, and Hampton/Newport News, VA.

In 1990, the fleet

of about 500 vessels landed over 40 million pounds of sea scallop
valued in excess of $150 million, making the fishery the sixth
largest in the United States by value (Sutinen et a l ., 1992).
Its economic well-being ensures the existence of numerous jobs
from boat captains and crewmen to processors and truck drivers,
and contributes to the prosperity of local economies.
Throughout the recorded history of the Atlantic scallop
fishery, a boom-bust pattern of landings has been exhibited.

In

1982, the New England Fishery Management Council in consultation
with the Mid- and South-Atlantic Fishery Councils created the
Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Sea Scallop to manage the
fishery.

Since that time, the fishery has been primarily

regulated by an average meat count regime (N.E.F.M.C., 1982) .
From 1970 to 1990, landings increased over 600% as effort
expanded nearly 800% (figure 1).

From 1988 to 1992, scallop
9
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catches were at historically high levels.

However, the bulk of

the harvestable stock was new recruits (3- to 4-year-old
scallops).

Since crossing the defined overfishing threshold in

mid-1986, the fishery has approached catch levels that are nearly
double the acceptable fishing mortality rate (figure 2).
(Overfishing, as defined by the NEFMC plan development team is
the fishing mortality rate that, if continued, results in a
spawning stock biomass of five percent of the maximum spawning
potential

(MSP)

(N.E.F.M.C., 1993).

Relatively high rates of

recruitment and elevated rates of fishing mortality appear to
have been the*- primary causes of this new recruit dependence
(Sutinen et a l ., 1992).

Fishing effort and mortality were

clearly excessive (N.E.F.M.C., 1992).

Figure 1. Landings and fishing effort (days fished) of Atlantic sea
scallops, 1960-1991 (Wigley and Serchuk 1992).
50
Landings (million lbs)
Days Fished (thousand)
40

30

20
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Figure 2. Composite fishing mortality on Atlantic sea scallops for
Delmarva, South Channel, and Southeast Georges Bank, 1982-1990. Mean
fishing mortality is weighted by landings from each resource sub-area
(N.M.F.S. , 1992) .
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During 1993, abundance surveys indicated that the overall
biomass of harvestable scallops approached an all-time low.
Likewise, catch rates by scallop vessels plummeted.

As of Fall,

1993, the level of harvest was roughly 50% of 1992 landings
(National Marine Fisheries Service, 1992).
The current scallop supply constraint causes many problems
from a business perspective.

First, wholesalers and processors

have difficulty guaranteeing buyers sufficient quantities of
larger scallops.

As a result, buyers may opt to purchase the

smaller, but more abundant bay or imported scallop.

Second, at
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current retail prices ($8-$9/pound), many consumers will choose
cheaper alternative seafood.

The less expensive bay scallop may

take market share from the sea scallop.

Already, one of the

largest seafood restaurant chains in the United States, Red
Lobster, has ceased purchasing sea scallops in favor of imported
Chinese bay scallops.

From a marketing perspective, once

established sea scallop markets are lost, they may be very
difficult to regain, regardless of future scallop abundance and
price levels.

The Open Access / Common Property Problem
The meat count regulation and other past management
approaches have failed to adequately acknowledge the basis of the
problems within the fishery (N.E.F.M.C., 1993).

Prior to

Amendment 4, the Atlantic sea scallop fishery was an open
access/common property fishery -- no prior regulations governed
the entrance of vessels

(effort) into the fishery.

Over the past

decade, numerous fishermen entered the seemingly profitable
scallop fishery, lured by the success of established fishermen.
Eventually, this glut of scallop vessels created an
overcapitalized fishery.
In an open access/common property environment, sea scallops
are readily accessible and available to anyone with a vessel and
gear.

The scallop fisherman has no property rights to a portion

of the potential catch or the ocean floor upon which it resides.
This is a classic situation for the occurrence of
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overcapitalization as described by Gordon (1954) and Scott
(1988).
In an overcapitalized sea scallop fishery, overall rent
(profit) to the vessels within the fishery will be driven to zero
over the long run.

As demonstrated in figure 3, with the

uncontrolled expansion of effort, total revenue will equal total
costs over the long run.

However, if effort is reduced, rent

(profit) of the fleet increases and is maximized at effort=Y{.
Figure 3. Fleet Rent At Varying Effort

$

TR = Total Revenue
TC
TR

TC = Total Costs
Y = Effort

o
E FFO R T

A similar scenario was exemplified nearly two decades ago by
the thousands of lobster traps placed virtually on top of one
another in the New England area (Fullenbaum and Bell, 1974).

Not

only did these traps catch an excessive amount of available
lobsters, but also they were redundant -- the fishery could have
caught the same number of lobsters with just a fraction of the
number of traps, and thereby decreased total costs and raised
rent within the fishery.
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Another major problem in an open access/common property
resource can arise when the population of a particular fishery
decreases to dangerously low levels.

As fish stocks decrease,

market price per unit of the resource may soar on account of
basic supply and demand.

Supply limitations may cause increased

pressure by fishermen, who are essentially in search of a lucky,
but profitable catch (Crutchfield, 1979).
This scenario is exemplified by the current North Atlantic
bluefin tuna fishery which was open access for many years.

Since

the 1970's, the stock of spawning-sized bluefins has become
smaller and smaller because of overfishing (N.M.F.S., 1989) .

The

current spawning stock is assessed at only twenty percent of its
1970 levels.

As a result of increasing demand for bluefin by the

Japanese sushi/sashami market and decreasing supply of available
fish, a single half-ton giant bluefin tuna can sell in excess of
$30,000.

Though such exorbitant prices may benefit a few

fishermen in the short run, no one will benefit in the long run
if the bluefin is fished to extinction.
Under previous management of the Placopecten magellanicus,
even if the optimal amount and age of scallops that should have
been landed from a biological and economic standpoint and the
optimal level of fishing effort that should have been exerted to
land that catch were known, the fishery manager could not have
limited the numbers of vessels attempting to exploit the
resource.

In the short run, this is acceptable assuming that

scallops are abundant (perhaps as evidenced by a lack of pressure
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to change past management practices in the scallop fishery).
However, in the long run, when a fishery becomes overcapitalized,
a lack of managerial power generally results in shrinking profits
to each vessel.

Eventually, net return (total revenue minus

total costs) will contract to zero as evidenced by recent
problems within the fishery.

Thus, the scallop fishery clearly

needs a viable solution to the problem posed by this threatened
resource and the overcapitalized fleet that exploits it.

Proposed Regulations
In response to the numerous problems confronting the scallop
fishery, NEFMC has proposed new regulations.

Amendment 4 to the

Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Sea Scallop recommends a
number of controls which include NTE limitations and additional
regulations:
1. Moratorium.

Restricts limited access fishing permits to

vessels already in the fishery.

No other vessels may

land scallop meats in excess of 400 pounds or 50 U.S.
bushels within a 24-hour period.
2. Vessel, operator, and dealer permits.

Mandates limited

access permits to the vessels, vessel operators, and
dealers.
3. Effort reduction program.

Restricts the number of days

that vessels may spend at sea.

Allowable days-at-sea

varies according to occasional, part-time, or full-time
vessel classification and decreases significantly through

the year 2000.

Adjustments of effort (increases or

decreases) may be made by the NEFMC in years three and
six of the plan.
4. Group assignment corrections.
5. Supplementary measures.

Allows for appeals.

Designed to limit a vessel's

production capability.
A. Crew Size.

Crew size is limited to nine crew members.

B. Shucking and sorting machines.

Shucking and sorting

machines are prohibited aboard vessels possessing 400
pounds or 50 bushels of scallops while at sea.
C. 3 1/2 inch minimum shell height.

Shell stockers are

subject to the current 3 1/2 inch minimum shell height
standard.
D. 400 pounds trip limit for non-qualifying vessels.
Non-qualifying vessels are restricted to 400 pounds or
50 bushels of scallop as a by-catch.
E. Dredge restrictions.

Escapement of small scallops and

by-catch is enhanced.
1. 3 1/4 inch minimum ring size in year one and two.
2. 3 1/2 inch minimum ring size beginning year three.
3. 3 0 feet limit on the total width of all dredges.
4. Prohibition on chafing gear, cookies, more than
double linking, or other obstructing devices.
5. 5 1/2 inch minimum mesh twine top.
F. Trawl restrictions.
by-catch is enhanced.

Escapement of small scallops and

1. 5 1/2 inch minimum mesh.
2. 144 feet trawl sweep limit.
G. Data reporting.

Participation in a data collection

and monitoring system is mandatory by all domestic
vessels and dealers.
H. Effort monitoring.

Full-time and part-time vessels

are required to utilize a transponder (vessel tracking
system) at all times.

Occasional vessels must comply

with a telephone call-in system.
I. Penalties.

Penalties for violations of the preceding

regulations may result in fines up to $100,000.00 and
permanent revocation of permit.
Unfortunately, these proposed limits on vessel inputs into
the fishery may not optimize future scallop catches or convey
maximum benefits to society.

Limiting the allowable days at sea

could result in capital stuffing (Crutchfield, 1979).

Under a

days at sea constraint, the average vessel operator would attempt
to catch as many scallops as possible during the limited
available time.

To accomplish this goal, the typical owner would

invest more capital into the vessel to make it capable of
catching more scallops in a shorter period of time.

Such

modifications would increase average costs, thereby decreasing
overall rent earned by the owner and operator.

Already, prior to

the introduction of Amendment 4, some vessel operators installed
devices such as remote rudder controls and remote dredge
operation capability to increase efficiency.
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In addition, days-at-sea are to be substantially reduced
over a seven year period.

As a result, changes in days-at-sea

are likely to significantly affect rent earned by vessels.

METHODOLOGY

NTE-, ITE- And ITQ- regulations are inherently different
approaches to managing the sea scallop fishery.
probable economic impact upon the fishery.

Each differs in

As a result, a

comparative economic analysis would produce data essential to the
potential adoption of any one, or combination, of these
prospective management programs.
Net economic returns from each regulatory system are
estimated through linear programming (LP) models of a panel data
sample of nine vessels within the fishery.

These vessels are of

varying length, gross tonnage, horsepower, age and overall
technology.

The LP models are derived from actual costs and

earnings of these vessels over a five year period from 1987 to
1991.
Predicted short-run equilibrium market prices per unit of
quota (days at sea or landings) are estimated for each management
program at varying levels of quota supplied, following open
market trade amongst all vessels in the fleet.

These quota

prices are considered an annual rental or lease price that
vessels would charge one another when trading quota.

Since these

equilibrium market prices require an estimate of market demand
for tradable quota, which in some cases may be zero, demand is
estimated by utilizing Tobin's censored regression technique.
19
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Tobin's technique simply recognizes that these values of quota
price must be greater than or equal to zero, because if a
vessel's demand is less than zero, it would be willing to pay
$0.00 for quota.
First, rental/lease prices for quota (shadow values) by
vessel are determined by the respective LP model.

Next, these

values along with their corresponding quota amounts are regressed
utilizing Tobin's technique, thereby forming an inverse derived
demand function for each vessel.

Through the summation of all

vessels' demand functions, an aggregate inverse demand curve for
the fleet is estimated.

Finally, resulting equilibrium market

prices at varying quota levels are calculated where the aggregate
inverse demand curve and the quota supplied curve intersect.
Additionally, fleet rent gains from trade (under ITE and ITQ
programs) are estimated.

These rent gains occur as vessels trade

quota allocations, y, between one another to maximize short-term,
individual vessel rent.

When less efficient vessels trade quota

to more efficient vessels, economic rents are theoretically
maximized.

Total fleet gains in rent equal the difference

between total fleet rent after trade and total fleet rent before
trade.

Linear Programming Models
Linear programming allows optimization (maximization or
minimization) through the manipulation of inequality constraints
in the form of G(x,y) ^ C or G(x,y) > C, rather than G(x,y) = C
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as in classical optimization.

Such constraints more closely

mirror actual markets, since they allow a consumer (or end user)
to choose any amount up to the limited amount available.

Also,

linear programming is more easily understood and accepted than
other simulation methods by resource managers and industry
members

(Squires and Kirkley, In press).

A linear programming model of NTE and ITE regulatory
programs is specified with the objective of maximizing short-run
rent of the sample vessels.

The model subjects these vessels to

input-oriented constraints on total allowable days-at-sea and
crew size, and a set of standard non-negativity constraints which
simply indicate to the model that a vessel cannot fish a negative
number of days per year.

These constraints attempt to mirror the

restrictions designated by Amendment 4 to the Fishery Management
Plan.

The following model is designated for each of the vessels:

NTE / ITE model:
Subject to: 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Max II = Em (Dm (PmAm - VCJ )

£Dm < DAS
Dm < D-5
Crew Size s 4
Crew Size
9
Dm > 0

II

= Profit per year
Dm
= Days fished in month m
Pm
= Average ex-vessel price perpound for month m
Am
= Average daily catch in pounds per day formonth m
VCm = Average daily variable costs for month m
DAS
= Total allowable days at sea
D
= Number of days in month m
The maximum number of days-at-sea per month is set equal to

(D-5) to account for layover days, vessel repairs, inclement

weather, and other events that inevitably reduce available
fishing capability.
equal to four to

Minimum crew size to operate a vessel is set

reflect of safety concerns and current fishing

techniques andessential

levels

of inputs.

Similarly, the following linear programming model maximizes
the short-run rent of each of the vessels within an ITQ
regulatory program.

The model subjects each vessel to the

output-oriented constraint of a total allowable catch, in
addition to crew size and standard non-negativity constraints.
The following model is designated for each of the vessels:

ITQ Model:

Max II = Em (Dm (PmAm - VCm))

Sub ject t o : 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

II
Dm
Pm
Am
VCm
y
D

'EDmAm < y
Dm < D-5
Crew Size > 4
Crew Size ^ 9
Dm > 0

= Profit per year
= Days fished in month m
=Average price for month m
=Average daily catch in pounds per dayfor month m
=Average daily variable costs for month m
=Total allowable catch (per vessel)
= Number of days in month m

Both linear programming models assume short run static
equilibrium and externally determined fixed input cost and
scallop price (Squires and Kirkley, In press).

Within the ITQ

program, supply of individual vessel quota (via quota allocation)
is determined from historical catch data extracted from trip
settlements; vessels that caught more scallops per unit effort
(i.e. pounds per day) are allocated a greater amount of initial
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quota.
Coefficients within the LP reflect the different costs,
revenue, and overall technology of the individual vessels within
the fleet.

These coefficients are derived from trip settlements

and are comprised of variable crew costs, variable owner's costs,
quasi-fixed costs, average scallop price per pound, average
pounds caught per day, average crew size, and additional revenue
(e.g. shack) .

The following are considered variable crew costs:

crew insurance, electric, fuel, oil, ice, food, captain's bonus,
mate's bonus, other crew bonuses, crew supplies, settlement fee,
and other miscellaneous costs.

The following are deemed variable

owner costs: maintenance and repair, insurance, owner's supplies,
and other miscellaneous costs.

Finally, the following are

considered (quasi) fixed costs: vessel opportunity cost (@ 9%
annually) , vessel depreciation (over 12 years), and captain and
crew opportunity costs.
Under NTE, ITE, and ITQ programs, demand by individual
vessels for supplied quota of either days-at-sea or catch quota
is derived from each vessel's costs and production technology and
is designated derived demand (Squires, 1990) .
preceding LP models

Solutions to the

(maximization of II) yield a unit quota rent,

t, that measures a vessel's implicit marginal valuation of quota
(the increase in profit with a one unit increase in the quota
constraint).

The unit quota rent is represented by a shadow

(dual) value of the quota constraint (i.e. the amount by which
rent changes for a one unit increase in the binding constraint).
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Inverse Derived Demand For Quota
As detailed by Squires and Kirkley (In press), and
Lanfersieck and Squires, 1992,

the linear programming model

initially estimates the shadow prices, t, for separate vessel
quotas, y.

Then, each vessel's inverse derived demand (where

price .is a function of quantity demanded and other exogenous
factors) for quota is estimated by regressing t upon the vessel's
quota, y and dummy variables

(which represent monthly

differences) using Tobin's censored regression technique.

Then,

through the summation of all of the sample vessels' derived
demand for quota, an overall market demand for quota can be
estimated under the respective management program (figure 4).

Figure 4.

Aggregate Derived Demand (D)

PRICE

o
QUOTA (Effort or Landings)

Next, as detailed further by Squires and Kirkley (In press)
and Lanfersieck and Squires (19 92), assuming that all quota may
be freely exchanged on the open market, the equilibrium market

price for quota, P, is estimated.

This price is determined by

the intersection of the fleet's aggregate derived demand curve
and the quota supply curve (i.e. the point at which demand equals
supply) .

The expected NTE/ITE price is estimated by the

intersection of the aggregate derived demand curve and allowable
days-at-sea supplied, while the expected ITQ price is determined
by the intersection of the aggregate derived demand curve and
different levels of total allowable catch supplied (figure 5).

Figure 5. Equilibrium Market Price (P)
At Quota * Y
PRICE

p

o

Y
QUOTA (Effort or Landings)

Then, as illustrated by figure 6, as the quota supplied is
varied in the model as a percentage of the current production
level, the equilibrium market price is predicted at different
levels of initial quota allotment (100%, 90%, 80%, 70%, 60%, 50%,
40%, 30%, 25%).

Once again, the expected NTE, ITE, and ITQ

prices are determined by the intersection of the aggregate
derived demand curve and varying levels of allowable days-at-sea
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and total allowable catch.

Figure 6. Equilibrium Market Price
At Varying Quota Amounts
PRICE

o
QUOTA (Effort or Landings)

Sensitivity of the unit quota rent equilibrium market price
to changes in the ex-vessel price of scallops is estimated by
calculating the difference between the unit quota rent for a
particular LP model at actual 1987-91 ex-vessel prices and the
unit quota rent at ex-vessel prices 1% greater than 1987-91
amounts.

The percentage difference between the two calculated

unit quota rent figures represents the likely percentage change
in equilibrium market price for unit quota rent following a 1%
increase in ex-vessel scallop price.

Rent Gains From Trade
Next, rent gains from trade are estimated.

Gains in rent

can occur in ITE and ITQ programs when vessels exchange quota in
order to maximize short-run profits (via adjusted production and

27
quota holdings). As shown by Squires and Kirkley (In press), and
Lanfersieck and Squires, 19 92, the total industry gains from
trade of quota at the equilibrium market price are equivalent to
the difference between total industry rent before trade and the
total industry rent after trade under respective management
programs.

The following example illustrates the process of quota

exchange between two vessels.
While the price received per pound of scallop is determined
exogenously, marginal cost (MC)

(the increase in cost for a one

unit increase in output) varies with level of quota held (figure
7) .

Figure 7. Marginal Cost Curve (MC)
PRICE

MC

0
QUOTA (Effort or Landings)

Rent (profit) for a vessel with a demand curve, D, and
marginal cost curve, MC, at quota level=Y is illustrated in
figure 8.

Likewise, MC varies between vessels.

For example,

figure 9 illustrates 2 vessels that comprise a fleet with the MC
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(supply) curves of MCt and MC2:
In figure 9, vessel 2 is the more efficient vessel, as its
profit per unit of quota is larger (remember, I I [profit] =
Revenue - Cost).

Therefore, following initial distribution of

quota, vessel 2 would value quota at a greater price per unit of
quota than vessel 1.

Therefore, assuming vessel operators want

to maximize profits, at the established quota, Y, vessel 2 will
Figure 8. Vessel Rent
PRICE

RENT
MC

MR

o
QUOTA (Effort or Landings)

Figure 9. Marginal Cost Curves
PRICE
MC
MC
MC*
MC

QUOTA (Effort or Landings)
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demand quota, while vessel 1 is willing to supply quota.

As

vessel 1 trades quota to vessel 2, MC2 increases while MC^
decreases.

Trading will cease once H

subsequently MCs, are equal).

= H2 (profit, and

As a result, vessel 2 increases

its quota holding to y2, while vessel 1 decreases its holdings to
Yi-

Such quota exchange amongst vessels creates gains from trade
due to an overall reduction in production costs, while aggregate
quota remains unchanged.

Economic rents are maximized and gains

in trade realized as less efficient vessels trade quota to more
efficient vessels.

RESULTS

Inverse Derived Demand for Quota
Both the effort-regulated (NTE and ITE) LP model and the
landings-regulated (ITQ) LP model were run nine times for each
vessel at varying percentages of total allowable quota supplied
(range of 100% to 25%).

Initial quota (i.e. 100% level) was set

equal to the aggregate fleet average for the five year period
(1987-1991).

As a result, each model generated nine pairs of

quota quantities and subsequent prices (unit quota rent, t) for
assessing the demand for quota.

These data were then used to

estimate inverse demand functions of each vessel using Tobin's
regression technique.

Again, Tobin's technique was necessary

since quota values were censored greater than or equal to $0.00
per unit.
The individual demand functions across the sample fleet were
summed and an aggregate inverse derived demand function of the
fleet was also derived.

Individual vessel demand for effort and

landings quota varied significantly between vessels as depicted
by the results of the regression for the NTE/ITE model and the
ITQ model in tables 1 and 2.
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Table 1. Inverse Derived Demand Functions
(NTE/ITE Model)
Vessel
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I

Quota Price
PA
PB
PC
PD
PE
PF
PG
PH
PI

-

Aggregate
P
T-Ratio
Sig. Level

Demand Function (y-Quota
(-5.09627)(y)
(-4.79334)(y)
(-4.43651)(y)
(-4.31867)(y)
(-4 .8 4 3 2 1)(y)
(-4.75990)(y)
(-6.55204)(y)
(-5.61005)(y)
(-3.47283)(y)
(-5.44379)(y)
-1 0 .0 8

0.00

♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

918
996
918
1266
1167
1123
1701
1740
788
1239
14.19

0.00

Table 2. Inverse Derived Demand Functions
(ITQ Model)
Vessel
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I

Quota Price

Demand Function (y-Quo a Supplied)
1.3985
1.7661
1.4224
1.6836
1.6139
1.5510
2.1430
1.7134
1.2210

PA
PB
PC
PD
PE
PF
PG
PH
PI

«
■
•
«
«
■

(-1 1 .2 7 1 0
(-1 3 .3 3 7 4
(-10 .24 0 1
( -8 .2 1 5 5
( -9 .2 6 3 6
( -9 .6 2 7 3
( -9 .5 8 5 9
( -2.7111
( -8.6181

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

10E-6)(y)
10E-6)(y)
10E-6)(y)
10E-6)(y)
10E-6)(y)
10E-6)(y)
10E-6)(y)
10E-6)(y)
10E-6)(y)

P
Aggregate
T -Ratio
Sig. Level

■
■
■

( -6.9211
-5 .8 9
0.00

X

10E-6)(y) ♦ 1.41384
10.20
0.00

Fleet Rents Before Trade
Total fleet rents before trade were estimated by summing the
rents of individual vessels at varying levels of quota supplied.
Disparity in estimated fleet rent before trade at the initial
quota allocation was the result of differences between the
NTE/ITE model and the ITQ model.

Negative amounts are in

parentheses.

Table 3. Fleet Rents Before Trade
(NTE/ITE Model)
Quota
Allocated
Initial
90% of
80% of
70% of
60% of
50% of
40% of
30% of
25% of

Equivalent
Days

Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial

255.6
230.0
204.5
178.9
153.4
127.8
102.2
76.7
63.9

Fleet
Rent
$417,022
$397,849
$359,207
$293,408
$195,980
$70,414
($70,306)
($267,970)
($330,791)

* Equivalent days and landings are per vessel

Table 4. Fleet Rents Before Trade
(ITQ Model)
Quota
Allocated
Initial
90% of
80% of
70% of
60% of
50% of
40% of
30% of
25% of

Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial

Equivalent
Landings

Fleet
Rent

145,706
131,136
116,565
101,940
87,424
72,853
58,283
43,712
36,427

$407,051
$359,056
$279,260
$180,891
$58,258
($ 7 9 ,3 1 6 )
($205,459)
($364,921)
($461,167)

Equivalent days and landings are per vessel

Equilibrium Market Price
Equilibrium market price at varying levels of quota supplied
was estimated for the ITE and ITQ models by solving for the
intersection of the aggregate inverse demand function, D, and the
aggregate quota supplied to the fleet, Y.

Each vessels' initial

quota allocation was set equal to the average number of days-atsea (NTE/ITE model) and average landings in pounds (ITQ model)
for the sample fleet over the 1987-91 period.

Tables 5 and 6 and

figures 10 and 11 depict the resultant equilibrium prices at
varying percentages of initial quota allocated.
Table 5. Equilibrium Market Price
(NTE/ITE Model - After Trade)
Quota
Allocated
Initial
90% of
80% of
70% of
60% of
60% of
40% of
30% of
26% of

Equivalent Average
Days at Sea

Resulting
Market Price

266.6
230.0
204.6
178.9
153.4
127.8
102.2
76.7
63.9

Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial

$0.00
$0.00
$160.30
$289.90
$410.80
$532.10
$653.60
$774.50
$843.60

* Equivalent days at sea are per vessel

Figure 10. Equilibrium Market Price
(N TE/ITE Model)
$/Day
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Table 6. Equilibrium Market Price
(ITQ Model - After Trade)
Equivalent Average
Landings (lbs.)

Quota
Allocated
Initial
90% of
80% of
70% of
60% of
50% of
40% of
30% of
25% of

Resulting
Market Price
$0.00
$0.3521
$0.6297
$0.6906
$0.8514
$1.0123
$1.1732
$1.3087
$1.3702

145,706
131,136
116,565
101,994
87,424
72,853
58,283
43,712
36,427

Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial

• Equivalent landings are per vessel

Figure 11. Equilibrium Market Price
(ITQ Model)
$/Pound
1.6

1.2
1

--

0.6
0.4

0.2
26
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% of Initial Quota Allocation

Unit quota rent equilibrium market price sensitivity to
changes in ex-vessel price due to increases or decreases in
landings or imports is illustrated in figure 7.

Price

sensitivity indicates the percentage change in unit quota rent
resulting from a 1% increase in ex-vessel price.

For example,
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the initial level of quota allocation, if ex-vessel price
increased by 1%, equilibrium market price for unit quota rent
would increase approximately 9.05%.

Conversely, lower ex-vessel

prices would result in lower unit quota rent prices.
Table 7. Estimated Unit Quota Rent Sensitivity To
Changes In Domestic Landings And Imports
Quota
Allocation

Nominal Dollar
Change

Equivalent Price
Sensitivity

Initial

$0.0192

9.05%

90% of Initial

$0.0271

7.24%

80% of Initial

$0.0413

6.32%

70% of Initial

$0.0394

5.23%

60% of Initial

$0.0386

4.10%

50% of Initial

$0.0352

3.48%

40% of Initial

$0.0371

3.30%

30% of Initial

$0.0364

3.14%

25% of Initial

$0.0367

3.07%

* P rice S ensitivity in d ic a te s th e p e r c e n ta g e c h a n g e in u nit q u o ta re n t
resu ltin g from a 1% in c re a s e in e x -v e sse l p rice

Fleet Rents After Trade
Total fleet rents after trade were estimated by first
simulating an open trade market between the nine vessels at each
level of quota allocation.

This simulation was created within a

BASIC computer routine that analyzed each individual vessel's
inverse demand for quota subject to a constraint on the total
landings and days-at-sea capability of each vessel during a year.
The total landings capability of each respective vessel is the
amount where marginal revenue,

(averaged over the five year

experimental period) equalled marginal costs (over the same
period) .

Likewise, the days-at-sea capability was approximated
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where scallop price (P) = MC, subject to an overriding limit of
3 05 days (five layover days per month were set aside for bad
weather, vessel repairs, etc.)
Next, the computer routine adjusted the days-at-sea quota
(ITE model) and landings quota (ITQ model) of each vessel until
marginal rent per unit of quota was equal across the fleet within
each model.

The resulting quota amounts per vessel were then

reemployed in the respective LP model to estimate rent for each
vessel.

Finally, these rents were aggregated across the fleet at

each quota level to produce a fleet rent after trade.
Table 8 illustrates each quota allocation for the ITE model,
equivalent average days-at-sea per vessel, subsequent fleet
landings as predicted by the model, fleet rents before and after
trade, as well as the resulting gains from trade.

Table 9

depicts the ITQ model's quota allocation, average landings per
vessel, fleet rents before and after trade, and resulting gains
from trade.
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Table 8.

Quota
Allocated
Initial
90% of
80% of
70% of
60% of
50% of
40% of
30% of
25% of

Equivalent
Days
255.6
230.0
204.5
178.9
153.4
127.8
102.2
76.7
63.9

Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial

Fleet Rents After Trade
(ITE Model)

Predicted
Landings
1,263,357
1,263,357
1,172,742
1,064,875
949,291
811,082
666,785
515,130
433,997

Rent Before Rent After
Trade
Trade
$417,022
$397,849
$ 359,207
$293,408
$ 195,980
$70,414
($70,306)
($267,970)
($330,791)

Rent Gains
From Trade

$418,272
$1,250
$418,272
$20,423
$392,078
$32,871
$344,005
$50,597
$263,670
$67,690
$144,724
$74,310
($893)
$69,413
($165,316) $102,654
($258,222)
$72,569

% Gains
From Trade
0.30%
5.13%
9.15%
17.24%
34.54%
105.53%
98.73%
38.31%
21.94%

* Predicted landings are aggregate fleet amounts

Table 9.

Quota
Allocated
Initial
90% of
80% of
70% of
60% of
50% of
40% of
30% of
25% of

Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial

Equivalent
Landings
145,706
131,136
116,565
101,994
87,424
72,853
58,283
43,712
36,427

Fleet Rents After Trade
(ITQ Model)

Rent Before Rent After
Trade
Trade
$407,051
$359,056
$ 279,260
$180,891
$68,258
($79,316)
($205,459)
($364,921)
($461,167)

$418,272
$394,554
$331,482
$242,340
$128,988
($3,170)
($147,191)
($298,264)
($383,959)

Rent Gains
From Trade
$11,221
$35,498
$52,222
$61,449
$60,730
$76,146
$58,268
$66,657
$77,208

• Equivalent days at sea are per vessel

% Gains
From Trade
2.76%
9.89%
18.70%
33.97%
88.97%
96.00%
28.36%
18.27%
16.74%

Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the transferral of quota
between individual vessels (A-H) at different levels of quota
allocated and the resulting percentage quota amounts per vessel
Note that vessel I left the fishery at 25% quota allocation
levels for both ITE and ITQ programs, since its valuation of
quota at this amount was below the market-formed equilibrium
price for the fleet.

Figure 12. Quota Distribution After
Trade (ITE Model)
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Figure 13. Quota Distribution After
Trade (ITQ Model)
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Figure 14 depicts the increased amount of landings by vessel
under an ITE-regulated program as opposed to an ITQ-regulated
program at varying levels of initial quota allocated.

Average

vessel landings increase under an ITE regime relative to an ITQ
program at the same allocation level because the more efficient
vessels that demand quota are generally capable of catching more
scallops in the same period of time relative to less-efficient
vessels.
Figure 14. Additional Landings Per
Vessel Under An ITE Vs. An ITQ Program
Landings Per Year (Thousands)

% of Initial Quota Allocation

m

Differences in fleet rent per year as the result of allowing
transferability of quota amongst vessels are depicted by figures
15 and 16.

Although transferability between vessels increases

rent to the fleet at all quota amounts depicted, its effects are
less at the higher quota amounts, primarily because of vessel
capacity constraints of the more efficient vessels.

Figure 15. Fleet Rents Per Year
(N TE/ITE Model - Before And After Trade)
Rent (Thousands)

$600
$400

$200
$0
-$200
-$ 4 0 0
50

100

150

200

250

3 00

D ays At S e a (Average p er Vessel)
NTE (No Trade)

—

I TE (After Trade)

Figure 16. Fleet Rents Per Year
(ITQ Model - Before And After Trade)
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Finally, percentage rent gains for the fleet as the result
of adopting either an ITE- or ITQ-oriented management program are
demonstrated at varying levels of quota in figures 17 and 18.

Figure 17. Percentage Rent Gains As
Result Of Quota Trade In An ITE Program
% Rent Gain
■120------------------------------------------------------
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Figure 18. Percentage Rent Gains As
Result Of Quota Trade In An ITQ Program
% Rent Gain
1001
------------
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COMPARATIVE EVALUATION

Inverse Derived Demand for Quota
Inverse derived demand for quota by individual vessels
relative to one another varied as predicted by economic theory.
The most efficient vessels within the fleet (those whose profit
per unit of quota was largest) were willing to pay the greatest
amount per unit of quota at the various levels of quota supplied
to the fleet.
At the 90% level of quota allocation, according to the ITE
model, vessels did not demand quota following trade, despite the
fact that similar amounts were indeed caught during the sample
period.

This discrepancy between the models and reality was

probably caused by fishing vessels' inability to accurately
predict landings and resulting revenues and costs prior to the
actual trip taking place.

In other words, a number of trips

(primarily during the winter months) were ultimately unprofitable
during the 1987-1991 period.
Thus, with 20/20 hindsight, unprofitable trips most likely
would not have been made by profit-maximizing firms.

Therefore,

with hindsight, vessels would demand less quota, causing the
equilibrium market price of $0.00 per unit of quota at the 90%
quota allotment.

Again, any equilibrium market price less than

or equal to $0.00 per unit will result in an equilibrium market
44
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price of $0.00 per unit.

Fleet Rents Before Trade
According to the NTE/ITE model, fleet rent was greatest at
the initial days at sea allocation of 255.6 days per vessel.
Short-run rents are completely dissipated (equal $0.00) at
approximately 4 5% of initial quota (about 115 days at sea per
vessel).

Likewise, the ITQ model predicts maximum fleet rent at

the initial quota allocation.

However, total rent dissipation is

estimated to occur for an initial quota of approximately 54%
(which yields about 82,000 pounds per vessel).
It is imperative to recognize that differences in fleet rent
between the NTE/ITE model and the ITQ model are not directly
comparable at each level of quota allocated when evaluating
potential economic benefits garnered under either management
program.

Since a NTE/ITE program limits days at sea, individual

vessels constrained by such a management regime would fish in
order to maximize profits on a per day basis.

On the other hand,

individual vessels within an ITQ program would fish in order to
maximize profits for every pound of scallops caught.
Thus, vessels may fish during different times of the year
under each management technique.

Furthermore, predicted landings

at the varying levels of quota following initial allocation
differ under each program.

For instance, at the 50% quota level,

the NTE/ITE model allows 127.8 days at sea and would result in an
average landings per vessel of approximately 87,611 pounds;
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whereas the ITQ model at 50% the quota level allows only an
average of 72,853 pounds per vessel thereby accounting for the
vast difference in fleet rents between the two programs at
various quota levels.

Equilibrium Market Price
Following open market trade within an ITE or ITQ management
program, an equilibrium market price per unit of quota forms
depending upon quota supplied.

As predicted by economic theory,

under both an ITE and ITQ program, estimated inter-fleet quota
price is greatest at the smallest quota amount (25% of initial
level) and smallest at the largest quota amount (100% of initial
quota).

This is caused by the monthly variations in catch rate

and scallop price and other factors which result in some days
during the year being more marginally profitable than others.
Worthy of note is the fact that within both models, landings
capacity (or the approximate maximum amount of scallops that a
vessel could catch during a year) was reached at the larger quota
amounts by the more efficient vessels of the fleet.

Resulting

quota prices would have been higher at the larger quota
allocation levels if the landings capability of the more
efficient vessels were increased.

For example, under the ITQ

model at the 50% quota allotment, vessel H (the most efficient
vessel of the fleet) valued quota at $1.22 per pound, while the
rest of the fleet valued quota at $1.01 per pound.

Yet, since

vessel H had reached its maximum landings capability during a
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year, equilibrium market price remained at $1.01 per pound.
Thus, if the landings capability of vessel H were increased,
the effects would be two-fold.

First, vessel H would increase

its quota holdings and equilibrium market price would reform at a
price greater than $1.01/pound, but less than $1.22/pound.
Second, overall fleet rent gains through trade would increase
under either management program as the more efficient vessels
would gain a greater proportion of quota.

Such effects are

important to note if any management regime (NTE, ITE, or ITQ)
allowed increased effort

(regardless of intent), because of the

increased economic value gained by the tradable nature of the
management program.

Fleet Rents After Trade
Greatest profitability again was achieved at initial quota
allocations for both the ITE and ITQ model, while negative fleet
returns resulted at the smaller quota allocations.

The ITE model

predicted that fleet rents were driven to zero at approximately
40% of the initial quota allocation compared to 45% if trade were
not allowed.

Likewise, the ITQ model implied rent dissipation to

begin below the 51% level compared to 54% if trade were not
allowed.
Rent after trade was greater at all quota amounts for both
models indicating that trade did indeed result in overall
efficiency gains for the fleet.

Nominal rent gains under both

ITE and ITQ models generally increased as supplied quota amounts
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were tightened.

The largest nominal gains occurred at the 30%

and 2 5% quota allocation amounts for the ITE and ITQ models
respectively.

However, on a percentage basis, the largest rent

gains from trade resulted at the 50% quota level of the ITE and
ITQ models where 105.53% and 96.00% rent gains occurred
respectively.
Although these sample vessels may or may not be
representative of the entire 223 full-time vessels that currently
comprise the fleet for Placopecten magellanicus, if the sample
results for each model were extrapolated over the entire fleet,
total nominal fleet rents after trade would increase an estimated
$1,923,803 under an ITE-regulated management program, and
$1,971,335 under an ITQ program.
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Table 10. Extrapolated Rent Gains From Trade For
The Entire Full-Time East Coast Fleet (ITE Model)
Quota
Allocated
Initial
90% of
80% of
70% of
60% of
50% of
40% of
30% of
25% of

Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial

Equivalent
Days/Vessel

Total Estimated
Landings

255.6
230.0
204.5
178.9
153.4
127.8
102.2
76.7
63.9

32,706,909
32,706,909
30,360,987
27,568,431
24,576,089
20,998,012
17,262,323
13,335,143
11,235,700

Rent Gains
From Trade
$32,361
$528,729
$850,994
$1,309,900
$1,752,419
$1,923,803
$1,797,025
$2,657,598
$1,878,731

* All landings are in pounds

Table 11. Extrapolated Rent Gains From Trade For
The Entire Full-Time East Coast Fleet (ITQ Model)
Quota
Allocated
Initial
90% of
80% of
70% of
60% of
50% of
40% of
30% of
25% of

Equivalent
Landings/Vessel

Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial
Initial

145,706
131,136
116,565
101,994
87,424
72,853
58,283
43,712
36,427

Total Estimated
Landings
33,949,498
30,554,688
27,159,645
23,764,602
20,369,792
16,974,749
13,579,939
10,184,896
8,487,491

Rent Gains
From Trade
$290,499
$919,004
$1,351,970
$1,590,846
$1,572,232
$1,971,335
$1,508,494
$1,725,676
$1,998,829

* All landings are in pounds

The small rent gains that resulted around the initial quota
allocation levels for either model were again caused by certain
vessels achieving capacity levels; if capacity were increased on
these vessels, rent gains from trade would have increased.

Quota Distribution After Trade
In comparing the ITE and ITQ model, greater landings would
occur under an ITE regime at equal levels of quota allocation
(other than the initial quota level).

The nominal difference in

landings peaks at the 6 0% quota level, where the average vessel
in an ITE program would catch in excess of 18,000 pounds of
scallops more than the average vessel in an ITQ program during a
year.
In addition, according to the ITE model prior to trade, each
vessel would own 11.1% of the total days at sea quota for the
fleet.

Following trade, at the 100% allocation level, vessel H

(the most efficient vessel at this quota level) would immediately
increase its quota holdings to about 13% of the total fleet
holdings, while vessel I (one of the least efficient vessels)
would decrease its quota to 9% of the overall fleet quota.
Similar transferral of quota amongst vessels would occur at each
overall quota allocation level.

At the smallest amount of effort

allocation (25% level), the model predicted that vessel H would
own about 28% of all quota, while vessel I would sell all of its
quota and leave the fishery.
Similarly, following trade at the 100% quota allocation
level, the ITQ model predicted that vessel H would obtain 15% of
the fleet quota, while vessel I would own 9%.At the 25% quota
level, vessel H would control an even greater 3 9% of all quota,
while vessel I once again would leave the fishery.
The differences between the ITE and ITQ

models in quota
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distribution amongst the vessels comprising the fleet is
attributable to the differing methods by which the vessels would
value quota under either management program and the differing
landings and days at sea at varying percentages of initial quota
allocated.

CONCLUSIONS

NTEs, ITEs and ITQs each embody a major change in management
of the scallop fishery.

All three alternatives attempt to

conserve the scallop population in order to maintain a maximum
spawning potential of approximately 5% of the overall scallop
population.

However, NTEs and ITEs require estimating resulting

future landings caused by limits on fishing effort, as opposed to
ITQs which directly limit total landings.
ITE- and ITQ-based management programs offer the sample
fleet greater economic rents compared to the current NTE-oriented
management program.

Although such results may not necessarily

reflect the potential outcome of either management approach on
the east coast scallop fleet as a whole, if these results were
extrapolated over the whole fleet, an additional estimated
$1,923,803.00 in total rent would be generated by the vessels
remaining in the fishery at present catch levels if trading were
allowed between vessels of current days at sea effort quotas.
Allowing transferability of effort within the current
management program would most likely have a number of effects.
First, effort quota would likely end up in the hands of the more
efficient vessel owners within the fishery assuming (1) industry
accepts the new changes in the management program,

(2) an open

market system for freely-tradable quota forms, and (3)
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alternative fisheries or uses for the vessels likely to be forced
from the fishery are available.

(A government-supported vessel

buyback program, although costly, may resolve this problem.

The

option of a buyback program is currently under consideration by
NOAA) .
Second, transferability of quota within an ITE program would
cause increased landings of scallops compared to an NTE or ITQ
program at similar percentages of initial quota allotments.

In

other words, a 10% reduction in effort would result in less than
a 10% reduction in overall landings.

For example, at a quota

level equivalent to 50% of 19 87-91 levels, the average vessel in
the sample fleet would catch an estimated 17,000+ pounds per year
more under an ITE program than an ITQ program.

Therefore,

if management considers making the current quotas on effort
transferable, an analysis should be conducted to estimate the
potential increase in landings by the entire fleet, as more
productive vessels would gain a greater percentage of overall
quota.
Finally, a potential downside to allowing transferability is
the potential monopolization of quota.

Following the

introduction of either an ITE or ITQ management program,
distribution of quota amongst a relatively small group of large,
highly-efficient vessels may result if regulations do not
proactively prevent it.
The adoption of an ITE or ITQ program would be of greatest
help (on a percentage basis) to the sample fleet if catch rates
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were approximately 50% of those during the 1987-1991 period.
Since current catch rates are roughly around this amount, the
potential economic benefits of adopting an ITE- or ITQ-regulated
management program are significant.
Given that the elimination of the meat count standard under
the current management program may increase short-run harvest
amounts and elevate meat counts (per pound)

(Kirkley and Dupaul,

1991), the adoption of an ITQ program may resolve these problems.
Since an ITQ-regulated regime constrains overall landings per
vessel per year, vessel operators would likely target larger (2040 count) scallops which return a greater price per pound than
smaller (4 0-70 count) scallops (high grading).

Thus, an ITQ

program could forcibly dissuade the potential targeting of the
currently abundant juvenile stock by the fleet.
However, under an ITE or ITQ program, crew members may not
benefit as a whole.

As quota transfers to more efficient

vessels, fewer and fewer vessels would theoretically remain in
the fishery if quota shrinks as currently planned.

Thus, with

fewer vessels in the fishery, more crew members would be forced
to find alternative employment.

As most east coast fisheries are

currently fully- or over-exploited, opportunities to these
departing men and women would probably be in other industries.
The current management regime of the scallop fishery, on the
other hand, may represent a favored alternative to a number of
crew members as neither vessels nor crew members are essentially
forced out of the fishery (in the short run).
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Finally, a potential point of contention relates to
potential ownership of quota.

Who would own the quota?

owners, captains, crew members or joint-ownership?

Vessel

If ownership

were spread across all involved members of the fishery under an
ITE or ITQ program, all would receive a paycheck if quota were
sold on the open market.

However, if quota is held solely by

vessel owners, only they would benefit if quota were sold on the
open market.
Thus, the adoption of any property-rights based system of
fishery management within the Placopecten magellanicus fishery
clearly requires careful planning and a proactive resolution of
potential problems.

This study outlines a useful procedure that

managers of the fishery could utilize to make further economic
predictions before the potential introduction of a new management
technique.
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